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STATUTORY COMMENT
Intestate Succession-Recent Statutory Changes
INTESTATE SUCCESSION
The 1959 General Assembly of North Carolina enacted a com-
pletely new and up to date Intestate Succession Act' for the benefit
of the citizens of this state. This act, effective as of July 1, 1960,
is now embodied in new chapter 29 of the General Statutes. The
new law has generally been well-received by lawyers and laymen
alike. However, its scope was such and the changes it wrought in
the old, medievalistic inheritance laws of North Carolina were so
drastic it could reasonably be anticipated that during a period of
adjustment after its enactment some flaws and discrepancies and un-
answered questions should appear. This proved to be the case, and
the 1961 legislature moved immediately to remedy these defects-
few in number and of relatively minor importance-as they were
brought to its attention. The amendments to the act will now be
discussed.
G.S. § 29-2 (1) concerning the definition of an advancement was
amended2 by providing that a writing designating a gift to a spouse
as an advancement must be signed by the donor at the time of the
gift. Before the amendment the statute required a writing in such
case but did not require that it be signed. This minor amendment
merely serves the purpose of clarification.
G.S. § 29-10 which permits an heir to renounce his intestate
share of a decedent's estate was rewritten in fairly extensive
fashion.3 Subsection (a) of G.S. § 29-10 has been amended so as
to make it clear that either the heir in person or his duly authorized
attorney, guardian or next friend (when approved by the clerk of
the superior court and resident judge of the superior court) may
execute the renunciation in writing. The amendment also confined
the right of renunciation to the entire share of the heir, thus re-
moving any complications that could arise under the old law which
permitted renunciation of the heir's share, either in whole or in part.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-1 to -30 (Supp. 1959). For a detailed discussion
of the new law, see McCall, Bolich & Wiggins, North Carolina's New In-
testate Succession Act, 39 N.C.L. Rxv. 1 (1960).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-2(1) (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 6, 1961).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-10 (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 6, 1961).
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The statute as rewritten also changes G.S. § 29-10(b) with
reference to the time within which an effective renunciation should
be filed. Under the prior law a renunciation to be effective had to
occur within one year after the death of the intestate. As a result
of the feeling that the one-year limitation was perhaps too arbitrary
and not sufficiently broad to cover the various situations which might
actually arise in the administration of the average estate, amend-
ments were made which have the effect of providing more flexible
time limitations for the filing of the renunciation. New subsection
(b) provides that:
Such renunciation must be filed within four months after
the death of the intestate if letters of administration are not
issued within that period; or if letters of administration are
issued during that period, then within two months after the
date of such issuance; or if litigation that affects the share of
the heir in the estate is pending at the expiration of such
period for filing the renunciation, then within such reason-
able time as may be allowed by written order of the clerk of
the superior court.
The new law amends old subsection (c) of G.S. § 29-10 by add-
ing a proviso thereto to the effect that where an heir has renounced
his intestate share "in no event shall the persons who inherit by
representation in place of the renouncer receive from the renounce-
ment a greater share of the estate than the renouncer would have
received." Under the method of distributing property, as set forth
in G.S. § 29-16, and under old G.S. § 29-10(c), it formerly was
possible for an heir to renounce his interest and thereby put his
representatives in a position to receive a larger share of the estate
than the heir himself could have received. For example, if P owning
an estate worth $90,000 should die intestate leaving no spouse but
survived by a living son B and one grandchild, E, son of P's de-
ceased child A, and also by grandchildren I and K, children of P's
deceased daughter C, B the living son of P would take one-third
of the estate or $30,000 and the other two-thirds or $60,000 would
be divided equally among the grandchildren E, J and K. But, if B
should renounce his intestate share of $30,000, he would be con-
sidered to have died immediately prior to the intestate P, and if B
had four children, F, G, H and I, they in effect would represent him,
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and, under G.S. § 29-16,' would share equally with P's other grand-
children, E, J and K, in P's estate. In other words, each grandchild
would get one-seventh of P's estate or $12,857.14. This would
mean that B's four children, F, G, H and I, would, as a result of B's
renunciation, together get a total of $51,428.56-considerably more
than B's original $30,000 share. To discourage such action on the
part of the heir, the amendment provides that those who take by
representation in place of the renouncer shall never receive a greater
share of the intestate's estate than the renouncer would have re-
ceived had he not exercised his right to renounce. This would be
$30,000 in the case just discussed.
New subsection (d) of the amending act is to the effect that: "If
no renunciation is made in the manner and within the time provided
for in subsections (a) and (b) hereof, the heir shall be conclusively
deemed to have waived his or her right to renounce." This amend-
ment merely states positively what was already the law by implica-
tion. It makes it clear that the provisions of the statute are manda-
tory and must be complied with if the heir is to exercise his rights
as given under the statute.
Former subsection (b) of G.S. § 29-10 is rewritten by new sub-
section (e) so as to guard against the heir or expectant heir exe-
cuting an encumbrance or transfer of his share of the property and
later renouncing his rights to his share of the estate. Under the
amendment, if the heir exercises any dominion over the property
by executing a mortgage, deed of trust, other encumbrance, or con-
veyance or contract to convey either the property or any interest
therein during the period allowed for renunciation, he waives his
right to renounce such property. To be effective against the de-
cedent's personal representative written notice of the waiver must
be filed by any interested party with the superior court clerk of the
county in which the renunciation could have been filed.
In order to facilitate both the administration of estates and title
examination, new subsection (f) of the amending act requires that
every renunciation or waiver of renimciation, provided for by law,
shall be filed with the clerk of the superior court and cross-indexed
by him in a record entitled "Renunciation" and kept by him pursu-
ant to G.S. § 2-42(33).r
Finally, new subsection (g) makes the provisions of section
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-16 (Supp. 1959).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 2-42(33) (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 6, 1961).
1962]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
29-10, as rewritten, applicable also to any portion of an estate with
reference to which a person may die intestate.
ADVANCEMENTS
G.S. § 29-27 was rewritten with reference to the accounting for
an advancement by the heir of an advancee when the advancee has
died before the intestate donor.6 The second sentence of old G.S.
§ 29-27, which provided for a difficult and involved accounting
procedure, has been deleted. The first sentence of the section, left
virtually intact, provides for a simpler method of accounting.
ELECTION To TAKE LIFE ESTATE IN LIEU OF INTESTATE SHARE
G.S. § 29-30, relating to the surviving spouse's election to take
a life estate in lieu of an intestate share in the decedent spouse's
estate was amended in several respects.7
Under the 1959 law it was mandatory that the life estate, pro-
vided for in subsection (a) of G.S. § 29-30, include a "life estate
in the usual dwelling house occupied by the suriving spouse at the
time of the death of the deceased spouse if such dwelling house were
owned by the deceased spouse at the time of his or her death. .. ."
It was seen that this inflexible requirement might impose an in-
tolerable burden upon the surviving spouse. The house might be
too large or too small or too expensive to keep in a good state of
repair, and there seemed to be no good reason why the surviving
spouse should not be allowed to select his or her one-third life in-
terest in improved real estate instead of being forced to take over
and maintain a dwelling house whatever its condition might be. As
a consequence, G.S. § 29-30(b) was amended to make the inclusion
of the dwelling house be "at the election of the surviving spouse."
Subsection (c) of G.S. § 29-30, with reference to the filing of
notice of the election provided for in subsection (a), was amended
and rewritten as to the first thirteen lines of subsection (c). This
was done in order to make it dovetail more consistently with the
dissent statute, G.S. § 30-2.8
G.S. § 29-30(c), as it was formerly written, required that the
election of the life estate be made within six months of the decedent's
death. A dissent under G.S. § 30-2(a), as amended in 1961, must
occur within six months after the issuance of letters testamentary or
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-27 (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 6, 1961).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 6, 1961).8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-2 (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 6, 1961).
[Vol. 4D
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of administration with the will annexed, or if there is litigation that
affects the share of the surviving spouse pending at the expiration
of the time allowed for filing the dissent, then within such reasonable
time as may be allowed by written order of the clerk of the superior
court in the county of the will's probate. The election provided for
in G.S. § 29-30 is not available to the spouse of one who dies testate
unless he or she dissents from the will. Therefore the right to elect
must be co-ordinated as to time with the right to dissent lest the
surviving spouse should exercise his right to dissent only to find that
his right of election to take a life estate has already expired. (A
dissent under old G.S. § 30-Z(a) must have been filed within six
months after the probate of the will.) To effectuate this co-ordina-
tion and hence to prevent the suggested unseemly result, the amend-
ment to G.S. § 29-30(c) provides a one month period after the
expiration of the time for the filing of the dissent within which the
surviving spouse may exercise his right of election as provided in
G.S. § 30-2.
Prior to the 1961 amendment thereto, hereinafter discussed, sub-
section (g) of G.S. § 29-30 provided that "life estates taken by
election under this section shall not be subject to the payment of
debts due from the estate of the deceased spouse, except those debts
secured by a purchase money mortgage or purchase money deed of
trust." Under the law as it was thus written it was not quite clear:
(1) whether household furnishings in which ownership is said to be
acquired in fee should be subject to the payment of the decedent
spouse's debts, or (2) whether, if prior to marriage, a person
obtained a loan giving a mortgage on his house to secure the debt
and subsequently married and died leaving a spouse surviving, the
mortgagee could foreclose on the property. In order to make clear
just what property interests are protected by G.S. § 29-30(g), and
to leave as little as possible to conjecture, subsection (g) was re-
written to read as follows:
Neither the household furnishings in the dwelling house
nor the life estates taken by election under this section shall be
subject to the payment of debts due from the estate of the
deceased spouse, except those debts secured by such prop-
erty as follows:
(1) By a mortgage or deed of trust in which the sur-
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viving spouse has waived his or her rights by joining
with the other spouse in the making thereof; or
(2) By a purchase money mortgage or deed of trust, or
by a conditional sales contract of personal property
in which title is retained by the vendor, made prior
to or during the marriage; or
(3) By a mortgage or deed of trust made prior to the
marriage; or
(4) By a mortgage or deed of trust constituting a lien on
the property at the time of its acquisition by the de-
ceased spouse either before or during the marriage.
Finally, subsection (h) of G.S. § 29-30 was amended to make it
comply with the changes as to the time limits within which notice
of election may be filed, set forth in subsection (c) as noted above.
FREDERICK B. MCCALL*
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
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